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Abstract: 
This study develops a Habermasian framework for evaluating and 
generating challenges to organizational legitimacy. The launch of the 
SaveDisney.com web site represents an innovative example of an Internet-
based activist public successfully challenging a corporation’s legitimacy and 
advocating for changes in corporate governance. Legitimacy research has 
focused on strategies used by organizations to build legitimacy (e.g., Dowling 
& Pfeffer, 1975; Metzler, 2001), but scholars rarely address how publics 
challenge legitimacy claims. Using Habermas’ conceptualization of 
communicative action and legitimacy to explore the SaveDisney.com case 
offers insight into ways that activist publics successfully challenge and reject 
the legitimacy claims of powerful corporations. 
In today’s ever-changing global landscape, organizations must 
constantly monitor their perceived legitimacy in relation to increasingly 
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widespread audiences. However, legitimation research has tapered off 
in recent years and has not fully considered public challenges to 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is understood as the congruence between public 
expectations and organizational actions and values (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975; Suchman, 1995), and legitimation is an essential process for all 
organizations, even being articulated as the core of all strategic 
communication practice (Metzler, 2001). The recent Internet-based 
SaveDisney campaign is a multifaceted case of an organizational public 
challenging an organization’s legitimacy, offering an opportunity to 
explore challenges to corporate legitimacy. 
The Walt Disney Company once again found itself in the media 
spotlight in late 2003, this time due to the split between the Walt 
Disney Company and former board members, Roy Disney and Stanley 
Gold. These resignations also signaled the beginning of an activist 
campaign that both called the Disney Company’s management 
practices into question and sought a change in leadership for the 
company. 
The campaign centerpiece was the web site SaveDisney.com, 
which chronicled the pairs’ efforts and serves as a striking example of 
changes in the landscape of activist publics and their interactions with 
organizations. The campaign was hailed as a historic shareholder 
revolt and represents a less researched form of activism, in which 
publics organize around issues of corporate governance rather than 
environmental or political issues. 
The use of the web site as a primary communication vehicle also 
highlights the increased use of technology in strategic communication 
practice. This use of technology provides greater access to more 
shareholders, thus generating greater participation. As such, the case 
of SaveDisney is also unique because it challenges conventional 
approaches to viewing publics as passive recipients of organizational 
attempts to build legitimacy1, since various publics including 
employees, shareholders, and fans were actively engaged in 
challenging the legitimacy of Disney Company practices. A trend of 
shareholders voicing concerns and questioning corporate practices with 
increasing frequency warrants a renewed focus on organizational 
legitimacy that examines the role of publics and their ability to actively 
engage with organizational discourses. This study seeks to answer 
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these calls within communication research by showing how a return to 
and incorporation of Jürgen Habermas’s legitimacy (1984, 1987) 
enhances the explanatory power of legitimacy theory in terms of the 
role for publics in the legitimation process. Specifically, a Habermasian 
framework for legitimacy offers explanations of how and why 
legitimacy claims made by organizations around the world succeed, 
fail, and are challenged by activist publics such as SaveDisney. 
In order to understand the implications of the SaveDisney 
campaign for research and practice in organizational legitimacy, we 
first address existing research on activist publics and organizational 
legitimacy. We then explicate a theoretical framework for 
understanding and assessing challenges to legitimacy based on 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action. This framework is then 
applied to the SaveDisney case. We conclude by offering suggestions 
for future research in the area of organizational legitimacy and dialogic 
public relations. 
Literature Review 
Renewed Focus on Publics and Activist Publics 
Public relations scholars increasingly cite a need to re-
conceptualize publics. As Leitch and Neilson (2001) argued, 
researchers often do not afford publics any real agency, yet this stance 
does not accurately reflect the current organizational environment. 
Botan and Taylor (2004) argued for the ways in which publics are 
integral to relationship building in public relations research. Publics in 
this sense can be viewed as active. Rather than seeing a public as an 
amorphous group of passive receivers of information, publics are 
“engaged critically as producers and reproducers of the community of 
discourse” (Chay-Nemeth, 2001, p. 2). 
To date, the area of scholarship answering this call most directly 
is research on activist publics. Grunig, Grunig, and Dozier (2002) 
defined an activist public as “a group of two or more individuals who 
organize in order to influence another public or publics through actions 
that may include education, compromise, persuasion, pressure tactics 
or force” (p. 446). Activist publics both initiate and are the target of 
public relations efforts (Kovacs, 2001), and Smith and Ferguson 
(2001) suggested that an activist public’s organization allows it to 
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“influence public policy, organizational action or social norms and 
values” (p. 292). 
Most activist studies either focus on the types of strategic 
communication used by activist groups to publicize their issues, 
legitimize their own efforts, and influence organizational practices 
(e.g., Bullert, 2000; Kovacs, 2001; Patterson & Allen, 1997; Smith & 
Ferguson, 2001) or address the ways in which organizational public 
relations practitioners can effectively respond to activist campaigns 
(e.g., Guiniven, 2002; Hearit, 1999; Taylor, Vasquez, & Doorley, 
2003). 
Regardless of the focal point (i.e., type of activist group strategy 
or organizational response), these studies do not focus on the actual 
content of the message strategies employed. Thus, little to no 
research exists that addresses issues of how and why activist publics 
challenge corporate legitimacy. 
Organizational Legitimacy 
Most organizational legitimacy reviews begin with Dowling and 
Pfeffer’s (1975) conceptualization of legitimacy as a relative fit 
between the social values of an organization’s publics and the 
organization’s actions. A number of scholars have taken up the task of 
defining the concept and understanding legitimation practices (e.g., 
Boulding, 1978; Boyd, 2000; Deephouse, 1996; Epstein & Votaw, 
1978; Hearit, 1995; Metzler, 2001; Suchman, 1995). In her review of 
organizational legitimacy research, Metzler (2001) noted, “simply 
stated, organizational legitimacy is an organization’s right to exist and 
conduct operations” (p. 321). 
This existing research reveals several things. First, while several 
scholars (e.g., Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs, 1992; Francesconi, 
1982; Goldzwig & Sullivan, 1995; Meyer & Scott, 1983) focused on 
organizational legitimacy efforts over a decade ago, legitimacy studies 
seem to have stagnated. This lack of use may be because the research 
has not moved beyond describing the legitimacy building strategies 
that a particular organization uses. 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) offered three strategies (change 
company policy to match society expectations, change society 
expectations to match company policy, and associate company with 
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other already legitimated symbols, values, and organizations). Coombs 
(1992) provided a more detailed categorization for organizational 
legitimacy that described 10 bases or sources for legitimacy-building 
strategies. His proposal did suggest that the effectiveness of these 
strategies could be evaluated by assessing public response. But 
scholars have noted that legitimacy literature does not offer a formal 
method for assessing why and how these various strategies might be 
effective (Meisenbach & McMillan, 2006). Such an assessment requires 
a renewed focus on publics in legitimacy research and a means of 
examining the content of claims. In seeking such a framework, we look 
to Habermas’s theory of communicative action as a useful perspective 
for providing a more nuanced and complex means of examining 
organizational legitimacy efforts. 
Theoretical Framework: Habermasian Legitimacy 
Habermas’s work has been used to analyze public relations 
efforts (see, Leeper, 1996) and has been mentioned briefly in analyses 
of organizational legitimacy efforts (Boyd, 2000; Leichty & Warner, 
2001; Metzler, 2001). In this regard then, there is precedent for using 
Habermas’s theory to explicate legitimation. However, current uses of 
Habermas have not yet incorporated the full robustness that the 
theory offers. We argue that Habermas’s theory of communicative 
action provides a more dialogic and content-based means by which 
legitimacy claims are assessed. This framework provides a means of 
articulating why some claims are more successful than others and 
situates legitimacy in the interactive space between organizations and 
publics rather than being viewed solely from an organizational 
perspective. 
Communicative Action 
Habermas (1984, 1987) was concerned with systemic barriers 
to communicative action in the lifeworld, such as financial and 
bureaucratic forces. He advocated balance between system and 
lifeworld, but contended that this ideal balance does not currently exist 
in society. Instead, the nondiscursive steering media of power and 
money have overtaken the public sphere. 
Habermas (1984) laid out his remedy in the form of a proposal 
for the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation is one in 
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which all parties are able to engage in open exchange to come to 
mutual understanding. This preferred form of interaction is his 
communicative action, explained as “the type of interaction in which all 
participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another 
and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation” (p. 294). 
Validity Claims and Legitimacy 
The basis of this harmonizing is the use of criticizable validity 
claims. Every utterance must be debatable in that the receivers can 
judge whether they see the speaker’s utterance as true, right, and 
sincere. Truth of an utterance refers to the veracity of the information 
presented in the utterance; rightness incorporates a sense of the 
normative understanding of a particular way of acting (i.e., consensus 
on underlying values); and the sincerity entails the appropriateness 
and sincerity of the utterance being made (Habermas, 1984). Thus, 
each utterance contains three types of validity claims (truth, rightness, 
and sincerity) that are judged by participants through the process of 
communicative action2. Organizations and publics are active 
participants in the legitimation of validity claims. 
Beyond the criteria outlined for legitimacy claims, Habermas’s 
communicative action calls for interaction in which all parties have 
equal access to participate in communication exchanges. Distorted 
communication represents those instances in which access for 
participation is blocked and all voices are not heard in a discussion. 
Habermas argued that all speakers in the public sphere have a 
responsibility to remove these barriers to communication.  
Like many theories, Habermas’s communicative action is not 
without its critics. Specifically, Mumby (1988) argued that the reliance 
on validity claims does not allow for a consideration of power relations 
that are embedded within practice. It is true that Habermas aimed for 
a discursive space in which power relations were equal, but he did 
recognize that that equality did not typically exist in society. His ideal 
speech situation is just that, an ideal toward which individuals and 
organizations may strive. Notably, however, Habermas’s ideal is very 
similar to Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) ideal of two-way symmetrical 
public relations practice (Leitch & Neilson, 2001). We argue that 
despite challenges of idealism, the provision of validity claims 
addressing truth, right, and sincerity provides a useful and dialogic 
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avenue for considering how and why publics respond as they do to 
legitimacy claims. 
Research Statement 
Activist efforts provide a ripe ground for considering the ways in 
which legitimacy theorizing can be improved. We have shown how 
existing legitimacy research lacks analysis of the content and success 
of strategies designed to challenge corporate legitimacy. This study 
seeks to fill this void by employing a Habermasian framework that 
illuminates and helps assess the ways in which legitimacy challenges 
are articulated and received. We use this framework to analyze the 
ways in which the SaveDisney campaign as activist public generated 
ultimately successful challenges to the legitimacy of the Walt Disney 
Company. 
Analyzing the Case of Disney 
The SaveDisney case is unique in that it allows for a thorough 
analysis of communication from publics that are challenging the 
legitimacy of the company’s practice. Most analyses of legitimacy 
begin with an organization’s claim to legitimacy, move on to public 
responses, and company rebuttals (Coombs, 1992; Meisenbach, 
2006b). In the SaveDisney case, there is no formal and publicly 
available claim to legitimacy with which to begin the analysis. 
Founded in 1923, The Walt Disney Company is the world’s 
second-largest media and entertainment conglomerate, consisting of 
five primary business divisions: Media Networks, Studio 
Entertainment, Theme Parks and Resorts, and Consumer Products 
(Hoovers, 2006; Walt Disney Company, 2006a). At the end of the 
2006 fiscal year, the company had 133,000 employees (Hoovers, 
2006), and according to Walt Disney Company’s 2006 financial 
documents, there were approximately 991,771 common shareholders 
(Walt Disney Company, 2006b). While the Walt Disney Company has 
enjoyed a great deal of financial success over the years, in the years 
leading up to the SaveDisney Campaign, revenue gains had slowed 
and income had fallen. In 2000, the company’s net income fell $380 
million from the previous year. Then in 2001, two years prior to the 
campaign, revenues fell $149 million from the previous year, and the 
company recorded a net loss of $158 million (Walt Disney Company, 
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2001). The company did rebound in 2002 with total net income of over 
$1.2 billion; however, this income still was below the levels of 1999 
(Walt Disney Company, 2006). In 2006, after Eisner’s departure, 
company revenues were over $34.2 billion with net income of over 
$3.3 billion (Walt Disney Company, 2006a). 
The issue developed when two individuals issued formal 
challenges to the legitimacy of policies in place at the Walt Disney 
Company. R. Disney and Gold argued that they had attempted to raise 
these challenges within the boardroom at Disney to no avail. Thus, this 
legitimacy analysis highlights ways in which and reasons why publics 
challenge the legitimacy of an organization’s actions, enhancing the 
focus on publics in the legitimation process. The very public and 
established challenge mounted by SaveDisney provides the 
opportunity for exploring the nuances of the hows and whys involved 
in a rejection of a corporation’s claims to legitimacy. 
Taking the basic principles of rhetorical analysis outlined by Hart 
(1997) and the methods offered by Cheney and McMillan (1990), we 
examined the content of the SaveDisney.com web site3, the Walt 
Disney Company annual reports, press releases from the Walt Disney 
Company and SaveDisney, and media accounts of the events that 
unfolded between November, 2003, and February, 2005. We included 
all texts that were publicly accessible and restricted media accounts to 
major media outlets (New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Time, and 
Newsweek). The primary source for this analysis is the 
SaveDisney.com web site. The focus here was on the specific 
challenges to Disney legitimacy posited by the SaveDisney campaign. 
In analyzing the evidence, we began with determining who was 
speaking, who was the audience, and what were the primary 
arguments made. Our analysis progressed by identifying themes that 
emerged across the arguments from the SaveDisney campaign. We 
particularly looked for themes related to the framework of 
Habermasian legitimacy. Namely, we identified challenges to the truth, 
rightness, and sincerity of Walt Disney Company claims. 
 
 
The Activists’ Campaign 
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R. Disney’s and Gold’s resignations from the Walt Disney 
Company Board of Directors marked the beginning of a shareholder 
revolt that resulted in significant change at the Walt Disney Company. 
The centerpiece of the revolt was an external campaign that came to 
be known as SaveDisney. The campaign was largely organized around 
the web site SaveDisney.com and was accompanied by a series of 
speeches, events, and press releases that focused on the overarching 
goal of corporate governance reform at the Walt Disney Company. 
R. Disney and Gold launched the SaveDisney web site in 
December, 2003, shortly after their board resignations. Their 
independent web page remained active until August, 2005. The web 
site evolved from a basic page that included a short message from R. 
Disney explaining the campaign goal to a highly stylized web page that 
mimicked Walt Disney Company promotional materials by using Disney 
fonts, images, and slogans. 
Although the SaveDisney web site took on three major formats 
throughout the campaign, the basic features and purposes remained 
the same. First, the front page featured a letter from R. Disney, which 
updated viewers about the current news and events associated with 
the campaign. In addition, the page archived news and editorials 
related to changes at the Walt Disney Company. The web page also 
included sections that posted letters, press releases, and speeches 
authored by the SaveDisney campaign organizers. Another section of 
the page included regular “Cast Member Outreach” letters. These 
outreach postings were written by R. Disney and targeted all 
employees of the Walt Disney Company. 
The site was not simply a storage place for campaign 
information; rather, the SaveDisney web site was highly interactive. In 
addition to all of the information that was available on the site, the 
SaveDisney page included letters to the editor, which were authored 
by Disney employees (known as cast members), consumers, and fans 
of the company. These stakeholders were also invited to participate in 
the campaign through the use of interactive polls and occasional 
questions, which asked web site visitors to share their Disney 
memories. 
The campaign spread largely through word of mouth and the 
use of an e-mail listserv that was open to any interested supporter of 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2007): pg. 207-226. DOI. This article is © Taylor 
& Francis (Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & 
Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
10 
 
the campaign. A link on the SaveDisney web site allowed any visitor to 
sign up for the listserv. Those who enrolled received a free bumper 
sticker with the campaign’s overarching slogan, “Restore the Magic.” 
E-mail messages encouraged list members to forward the e-mail to 
others who would want to “join the fight.” The campaign organizers 
also publicized the campaign through SaveDisney merchandise that 
was available on the web site and through letters mailed directly to 
Walt Disney Company shareholders. 
The web site served as a forum for discussing the overarching 
campaign goal of corporate governance reform. Throughout the 
campaign, R. Disney and Gold consistently cited a need for a change in 
the way leaders were selected for the company and the ways in which 
these leaders made decisions affecting the future of the company. 
Their first objective was the removal of Michael Eisner, CEO and Chair 
of the Board of Directors. Using the web site, press attention, and 
letters to the shareholder, R. Disney and Gold staged a meeting of 
revolters just prior to the annual company shareholders meeting in 
February, 2004. The SaveDisney campaign is credited with leading to 
a vote of no confidence for Michael Eisner, which led to his eventual 
resignation. After this success, the campaign continued on and 
targeted the succession plan for Eisner and also focused on the 
direction of the company. Initially, the campaign organizers railed 
against the selection of Bob Iger, a perceived Disney insider, as CEO to 
replace Eisner. But, in April, 2005, an agreement was reached by R. 
Disney, Gold, and the Walt Disney Company. R. Disney returned to the 
company with an emeritus director’s position and the campaign, 
known as SaveDisney ended with the web page being taken down in 
August, 2005. 
Challenges to Corporate Legitimacy 
We use the SaveDisney activist campaign as a case for 
demonstrating the explanatory power of a Habermasian perspective on 
legitimacy. First, we examine how SaveDisney campaign managers 
implicitly assumed the desirability of and called for Habermas’s 
communicative action. This assumption helps justify the activist 
organization’s decision to find a voice via the Internet for itself and its 
challenges to the Walt Disney Company. We then use our 
conceptualization of Habermas’s validity claims to demonstrate how it 
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can enhance understanding of how and why a company’s legitimacy 
claims may be challenged by publics. 
Call for Communicative Action 
“Clearly, though these people [The Walt Disney Board of 
Directors] aren’t yet listening as they should. Their arrogance is almost 
unbelievable.” These are the words of R. Disney in his welcoming 
statement on the SaveDisney web site just after the vote of no 
confidence in February, 2004, and they represent one of the key 
assumptions of the SaveDisney challenge. From the beginning of this 
campaign, the SaveDisney organizers focused on a lack of listening on 
the part of the Walt Disney Board of Directors, in general, and Michael 
Eisner, in particular. Central to the critique was the contention that 
corporate management should allow for open dialogue in which all 
parties have opportunity to participate. 
Gold’s resignation letter specifically addressed the issue of open 
debate as he wrote: 
I cannot sit idly by as this Board continues to ignore and 
disenfranchise those who raise questions about the 
performance of management ...Instead, the Board seems 
determined to devote its time and energies to adopting 
policies that ...only serve to muzzle and isolate those 
Directors who recognize that their role is to be active 
participants in shaping the Company and planning for 
executive succession. (December 1, 2003) 
This notion that the Board was actively seeking to curb dissent 
is echoed in R. Disney’s open letter to cast members that was written 
on December 3, 2003. R. Disney argued that: 
this is a Board that seeks to avoid the constructive tension 
necessary to guide management through difficult times. 
Instead, it is a Board that seeks to stifle dissent and, to that 
end, has asked me to leave the Board of Directors. 
Again in a letter to the newly appointed Chairman of the Board on 
February 6, 2004, from Michael McConnell, the spokesperson for the 
Roy Disney-owned Shamrock Holdings, the need for an open debate of 
ideas was highlighted. McConnell questioned the decision to disinvite a 
prominent independent corporate analyst from an upcoming Disney 
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company meeting: “We believe that trying to aggressively manage the 
free flow of ideas and viewpoints among the Company’s many 
constituents in this manner is not ‘best practice’ or admirable.” 
All of these statements construct an argument for what the 
SaveDisney organizers believed should be the interaction between key 
stakeholders and corporate managers. The exchange should involve 
clear and direct statements, followed by listening, and an engagement 
of any voices of dissent. Ultimately, the communication situation that 
the SaveDisney campaign advocated is that of the ideal speech 
situation and communicative action in which all parties are free to 
participate with the final goal of reaching some understanding or 
mutual agreement. While this is an “ideal” situation, as the 
SaveDisney campaign organizers point out, no such agreement is 
possible if the Board fails to listen and actively engage any 
disagreements. 
Because the SaveDisney campaign relied on this belief in 
engaged discussion that explores tension and disagreement, the 
rhetoric of the campaign also included a strong call to action of 
shareholders, employees, and the public that suggested as interested 
parties they should voice their opinions. In this, the argument 
acknowledged that for the process to work, those with an opportunity 
to participate in discussion should do so. This idea comes through in 
repeated calls by R. Disney, Gold and the SaveDisney team for 
shareholders, cast members and the public to vote if they are able, 
and to send faxes and e-mails. Even as the campaign was ending, this 
vision of communicative action was maintained. In the final Cast 
Member Outreach letter on April 11, 2005, R. Disney wrote that as 
changes were beginning to occur within the Disney management 
practices, “hopefully, all Cast Members, will now be given the 
opportunity to express their ideas, their thoughts and their hopes for 
the direction of their individual divisions and ultimately for the entire 
company. So this can be a very good thing.” To the SaveDisney team, 
this participatory voice is the hallmark of good corporate governance, 
and it is a voice that aligns with Habermas’s communicative action. 
Thus, the case demonstrates publics assuming the rightness of a 
communicative action process, leading us to consider the content of 
the SaveDisney campaign’s powerful challenges to the company’s 
legitimacy. 
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Truth, Right, and Sincerity of Claims 
We begin by examining the SaveDisney campaign through the 
lens of organizational legitimacy. The Habermasian perspective allows 
us to offer greater explanation of this legitimation process by allowing 
for a consideration of how conditions for communicative action are 
relevant and by providing a means of identifying the types of 
challenges to legitimacy that were made. 
Now, we want to know what you actually and honestly think 
about it! Do you feel that the CEO search was thoughtfully 
carried out? Do you feel that the Board was sincere and 
honest to yourselves to the Shareholders and to the Public? 
Keep in mind, Dear Cast Members, that the Walt Disney 
Company is your company, and you have a right to know the 
facts! The Shareholders whom the Board works for has the 
right to know! All of us who love the Disney Legacy have a 
right to know. 
This series of questions was posed by R. Disney and Gold after 
George Mitchell, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Walt 
Disney Company, wrote to all Disney cast members explaining how 
Bob Iger had been selected as the new CEO to replace Michael Eisner. 
In a press release conveying the same basic message, Mitchell claimed 
that, “After a thorough and careful process, comparing both internal 
and external candidates against our criteria for CEO, the Board 
concluded that Bob Iger was clearly the best qualified individual to 
lead this company into the future” (March 13, 2005). 
The SaveDisney questions here regarding this announcement 
are telling in that they reveal the specific tactics used when 
challenging the Board of Director’s actions. First, they questioned the 
truth of the claim that the search was indeed a thoughtful and 
thorough process. Second, they questioned if the Board had the right 
to present these claims in this way (i.e., without input from 
shareholders). Finally, they explicitly questioned the sincerity of the 
statements. All three of these concerns represent the three types of 
validity claims outlined in Habermas’s theory of communicative action, 
and they comprise the majority of arguments made by the SaveDisney 
team against the management of the Walt Disney Corporation. 
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Habermas first suggested that an individual can challenge the 
truth of the claim, that is, questioning whether the statement uttered 
is honest and true to the facts. In a letter to the Board of Directors 
dated February 24, 2004, R. Disney and Gold challenged the truth of 
Disney company claims that “The Board and senior management are 
committed to the highest standards of corporate governance” (Walt 
Disney Company, 2004). R. Disney and Gold wrote: 
We believe that you have mischaracterized what actually 
transpired with respect to the Company’s executive 
compensation decisions regarding Mssrs. Eisner and Iger. If 
your announced commitment to transparence and good 
governance is truly a reality, why does the Company continue 
to oppose in the Delaware Court of Chancery our efforts to 
make public the facts regarding the deliberations and outside 
advice utilized by Ms. Estrin? ... Is the Board afraid that 
Disney shareholders will see that the Boards’ public 
statements are inconsistent with actual boardroom conduct? 
Ms. Estrin has repeatedly claimed that ‘perception does not 
match reality’ regarding governance at The Walt Disney 
Company. We agree. 
The implication of their probing and lawsuit is that the Board of 
Directors has not been honest in portraying its decision-making 
process. The charge that the directors are afraid that people may see 
that their actions do not match their words directly calls into question 
the truth of the Board’s claim of independent decision making 
processes. A year later, R. Disney and Gold continued to question the 
truth of Mitchell’s claim about conducting a “thorough and careful” 
search: 
The selection of Bob Iger is yet another example of this 
Boards’ breach of faith. The pledge made by Chairman 
Mitchell to conduct a bona fide search was a ruse to avoid a 
contest at the 2005 annual meeting. Mr. Mitchell’s approach 
to good governance is no better than a carny at the fair, 
enticing words but in the end the game is rigged. Disney 
Shareholders have been conned and their trust in this Board 
abused. 
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Again, the statement points out the ways in which the Board made 
claims that did not represent fact as understood by the SaveDisney 
public. 
While challenges to the truth of claims are frequently present in 
SaveDisney’s rhetoric, these truth claims are often accompanied by 
challenges to the rightness of Walt Disney Company claims. 
Meisenbach (2006a) noted that there are two senses of right that 
scholars address when citing Habermas’ validity claims. The first is 
right in the sense of whether the content of the claim is evaluated as 
right or just, and the second questions whether it is right for the 
speaker to articulate this claim in this situation. In analyzing the 
charges made by the SaveDisney team both aspects of this legitimacy 
challenge are present—although not always in direct statements. First, 
R. Disney, Gold, and the SaveDisney team devoted a great deal of 
their argument to challenging how decisions were made in regard to 
compensation for executives and in the selection of a new CEO. 
Their line of reasoning was that the consultants used in this 
process were not truly independent and therefore did not have the 
right to make such claims on behalf of the company. In addition, they 
challenged the active participation of Michael Eisner in the interviewing 
of candidates for the CEO suggesting that since he represented the 
problem he should not be involved in the presenting the solution. In 
this, they challenged the rightness of any claims that Eisner should 
participate in the interviewing process. Overall, any time the 
SaveDisney rhetoric challenged the truth of a Disney company 
statement, there was an assumed argument that making this claim 
was, therefore, wrong. Throughout their statements, SaveDisney thus 
challenged the legitimacy of the Board’s actions by questioning the 
rightness of their claims. 
Finally, the SaveDisney team not only challenged the truth and 
rightness of some company claims, it also consistently pointed out 
flaws in the sincerity with which certain statements were offered, that 
is to say that they argued that the Disney Board stated things that 
while technically true, were not offered in a spirit of truthfulness. In 
their letter to shareholders on February 12, 2004, R. Disney and Gold 
outlined their concerns: 
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In their [February 6, 2004] letter, Disney’s directors point to 
the rise in the stock price as an example of the value they 
would like you to believe has been created. But a short-term 
spike in the share price is no substitute for consistent long-
term performance. Moreover, a significant portion of that 
short-term spike is attributable to a single motion picture, 
Finding Nemo, which is the product of the company’s now 
disintegrating Pixar partnership. That is a fact that the current 
Board and senior management conveniently gloss over in 
their self-laudatory proclamation of the company’s 
performance. In a vivid demonstration of what is wrong with 
current Disney leadership, the Board’s letter touts recent 
successes—that still amount to a five-year negative return on 
investment—and completely ignore the loss of Pixar. 
The crux of this claim is that while the individual Disney 
statements are technically true, they are not offered in a spirit of 
truthfulness, but rather with the intent to mislead. Throughout this 
campaign, R. Disney and Gold repeatedly stated their belief that Eisner 
and the Board were not sincere in their claims, that is that they never 
truly meant what they said in public. The often-repeated charges of 
“smokescreens” and “PR spin” highlighted the degree to which the 
SaveDisney team chose the tactic of challenging the sincerity or 
truthfulness of the Disney management’s claims. For example, Gold 
addressed the ongoing situation at the Walt Disney Company in a 
speech that he gave on May 3, 2004. In this speech, Gold referenced 
the lyrics of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta, The Mikado: 
Has anything of substance changed between Mr. Eisner and 
his former president director? Of course not, nothing has 
changed, in part because the Disney board doesn’t get it ... 
And in part because they don’t have to get it ... Because 
they are playing on a cloth untrue, with twisted cue and 
elliptical billiard balls. 
The suggestion that the Board is playing on a cloth untrue is another 
means of saying that the Board is not being completely forthright in 
their statements. This sentiment is echoed in R. Disney and Gold’s 
letter to the nonemployee Board members, “While Mr. Eisner’s 
announcement at first blush looks like a major change, it is in truth 
mere window dressing. What he has really proposed is a scheme to 
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arrogate the authority of the Board and maintain the status quo at the 
Company’s expense.” 
While Habermas’s three types of legitimacy claims are distinct, 
they are interrelated and work together in this case to build a 
challenge to the legitimacy of the Walt Disney Company Board actions. 
The SaveDisney campaign is significant in its use of message 
strategies that specifically question the practices of the Walt Disney 
Corporation by explicitly and implicitly questioning corporate practice 
based on three criteria that directly parallel that of Habermas’s theory 
of communicative action and legitimation processes. In this, this case 
suggests a means by which activists might organize the content of 
their claims (which both activists and corporate representatives can 
benefit from knowing) and further provides a set of criteria that can be 
used to assess the effectiveness of activist and related legitimacy 
challenges. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Our analysis of the SaveDisney campaign as a whole and the 
specific arguments and claims made by Roy Disney, Stan Gold, and 
the rest of the SaveDisney campaign reveals a number of significant 
and interesting findings. The case presents an intriguing example of 
activist rhetoric conducted on a nontraditional issue, in a 
nontraditional, but growing form, the Internet. Furthermore, the case 
is notable for the sophistication and ultimate success of the campaign. 
The case also demonstrates how Habermas’s communicative action 
can serve as a framework for understanding how activist publics 
generate and organize their arguments. 
While the SaveDisney campaign fits within the framework of 
activism, it expands research on activism because its focal point is not 
a public policy or an environmental issue, but rather a corporate 
governance issue. Despite the type of issue addressed, the SaveDisney 
campaign fit activist definitions and used activist tactics. The calls to 
remove Eisner and restructure the Board were all part of the larger 
argument that corporations need to be more accountable to 
shareholders and consumers and be more transparent in their business 
decisions. Thus, the case demonstrates that research on activist 
efforts can be used as a means of understanding campaigns for 
corporate reform. Further, those groups seeking corporate reform can 
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look to activist tactics as a means of exerting pressure and influence 
on organizations. 
The SaveDisney campaign stands apart from previous analyses 
of organizational legitimacy challenges because of its success and its 
sophisticated use of activist-like tactics. Much of this sophistication 
draws from the use of arguments and appeals that are directly parallel 
to Habermas’s call for communicative action and the use of criticizable 
legitimacy claims. Thus, this case demonstrates the salience of 
Habermas’s theory of legitimacy for examining legitimacy challenges. 
The three Habermasian themes identified in this case work together in 
a way that affirms our contention that organizational communication 
and public relations scholars would benefit from taking a renewed look 
at Habermas’s conceptualization of legitimacy. The rationale for this 
claim is found in the call for the ideal speech situation, grounded in 
communicative action. That is, the SaveDisney team rationalizes the 
need for change by pointing out the ways in which open participation 
is not provided for by the Walt Disney Board. Embedded within this 
claim is the assertion that the board should be allowing this type of 
communicative interaction. 
The call for communicative action on a broad level is bolstered 
by direct challenges to the truth, right, and truthfulness of the claims 
made by the management of the Disney Company. The major premise 
of communicative action is that claims that are legitimate are those 
that can be contested and debated. That is, publics should be able to 
accept or reject a claim. 
SaveDisney’s challenges to private corporate utterances (such 
as boardroom communications that we could not access) highlighted 
how the Disney Board was blocking possibilities for open discussion 
and debate. In questioning the truth, right, and truthfulness of 
corporate claims they could access, the SaveDisney team successfully 
challenged legitimacy. Specifically, shareholder votes suggested that 
they agreed with SaveDisney, that corporate Disney claims were 
inaccurate, purposefully distorted, and insincerely offered. Thus, the 
Habermasian framework enhances understanding of why and how a 
corporation’s claims to legitimacy may be challenged by an activist 
public. Such knowledge has implications for corporate and activist 
practitioners. 
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Limitations 
While this case study yields significant findings, there are 
limitations. Dozier and Lauzen (2000) contended that a problem with 
much of public relations research is that it focuses on organizations 
with the money and resources to hire an effective public relations 
practitioner. Similarly, R. Disney and Gold had unusual and significant 
resources at their disposal that helped them to launch and fund a 
sophisticated web site and campaign. While we acknowledge this 
limitation, Guiniven (2002) pointed out that activist groups are 
continuing to grow and develop larger budgets. Furthermore, the 
Internet is a highly accessible medium that is increasingly being used 
by activist groups (Holloway & Stokes, 2006). In the very recent past, 
SaveDisney would have had to rely on mainstream press coverage or 
traditional proxy fights, but with little opportunity to gain such 
attention. The Internet, however, offers a credible channel for activists 
(and status quo supporters) to generate mainstream media interest in 
their causes. As such the SaveDisney campaign may be a model for 
future activist efforts. Future study of legitimacy challenges originating 
from external sources would benefit from including other campaigns 
that are not as well-resourced as the SaveDisney campaign. 
Second, while doing so highlights the currently underresearched 
public side of legitimation, this study is limited in its primary focus on 
the activist side of this campaign. The SaveDisney campaign was 
complex and extended over the course of 15 months, yet the Walt 
Disney Company rarely publicly responded to the campaign. As a 
result, the majority of messages examined in this study originate from 
the activists who were challenging the Walt Disney Company. As 
strategic communication research continues to acknowledge and 
embrace a relational view perspective, we hope that future studies will 
be able to provide fuller analyses of the messages and rhetorical 
strategies of both organizations and their challengers. 
Theoretical Implications 
Despite these limitations, the use of Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action for analyzing the SaveDisney case extends 
theoretical understanding of legitimacy in several ways. This case 
study provides a much needed initial exemplar of dialogic theory (Kent 
& Taylor, 2002) and organizational engagement philosophy (Taylor, 
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Vasquez, & Doorly, 2003) in action. This study contributes to this line 
of research by explicitly focusing on public challenges that question the 
(non)dialogic stance taken by the Walt Disney Company. The 
legitimacy challenges made by SaveDisney affirm the desirability of 
organizations engaging their publics. Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action predates much of the work on dialogic public 
relations and the model of engaged public relations. Yet, these 
perspectives share a great deal. All three perspectives call for an 
analysis of the interaction between organizations and publics. Further, 
all advocate for the provision of open debate for understanding. Given 
these similarities, it is interesting to note that Habermas is rarely 
referenced in these discussions of public relations as dialogue (for an 
important exception, see Leeper, 1996). 
We find that Habermas’s theory of communicative action 
provides a useful complement to the dialogic and engaged perspective 
because it offers a specific vision for communication interactions 
through the ideal speech situation, and it offers specific bases upon 
which the legitimacy of statements might be challenged. In this, the 
specific content of organizational and public messages is the key focus 
of analysis. Thus, the theory of communicative action has the potential 
to contribute a great deal to communication and specifically 
organizational strategic communication theory because it focuses on 
the need for claims that can be criticized and provides a vocabulary for 
examining these claims that is missing from other discussions of 
legitimation. 
While we argue that a renewed look at Habermas’s claims is 
salient across contexts, the role of technology in this case cannot be 
overlooked. The use of technology itself does not create conditions for 
challenging the legitimacy claims of the corporation; rather, the use of 
the internet makes the specific means by which activists might 
challenge organizational legitimacy more visible. The web site created 
an avenue for increased stakeholder involvement, thus, allowing for 
greater opportunity for the claims of the Walt Disney Company to be 
challenged. In this, the SaveDisney campaign provides an exemplar of 
how technology allows for a more interactive form of strategic 
communication (Feldner & Meisenbach, 2007). 
Pragmatic Implications 
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Although the SaveDisney team never drew upon the language of 
Habermas, it naturally challenged the three aspects of validity offered 
by Habermas. This recognition is a key finding that suggests other 
activist and resistance groups can look to Habermas’s communicative 
action as a workable template for constructing arguments. This 
connection is also instructive for organizations susceptible to activist 
challengers, who should recognize the extent to which publics are 
interested in, and even demand, active and meaningful participation. 
Furthermore, by being aware of these strategies, challenged 
organizations can intentionally bolster the truth, rightness, and 
sincerity of their arguments both prior to and after being challenged. 
In other words, Habermas’s validity claims provide criteria against 
which claims can be evaluated by both messages generators and 
receivers. Furthermore, since the presence of these validity claims is 
universal, they can be tested in and applied to international and cross-
national efforts. 
The strategies and tactics used by the activist group SaveDisney 
also provide an exemplar for how arguments might be constructed in 
other contexts. Since Habermas suggested that the three claims are 
up for validation in any utterance, their applicability extends well 
beyond activist rhetoric. For example, shareholders and employees 
interested in agitating for change from within can look to these 
strategies to structure their challenges in ways that directly address 
corporate claims. Similarly, corporations can challenge the truth, 
rightness, and sincerity of activist group claims. Organizations 
everywhere can also roll out new practices and products by initially 
presenting strong claims to truth, rightness, and sincerity. Thus a 
Habermasian approach to legitimacy opens up a method for analyzing, 
challenging, and creating a variety of arguments. 
Finally, the case points to the use of the Internet as a means by 
which stakeholders might gain greater voice in corporate governance 
processes (Feldner & Meisenbach, 2007). Unlike traditional media 
outlets that present greater barriers for activists to be heard, the 
Internet provides relatively few such obstacles. As a result, both 
internal and external audiences are able to challenge the legitimacy of 
corporate policies no matter how large or small they may be. 
SaveDisney also serves as a cautionary tale to corporations. The Walt 
Disney Company chose to offer few responses to the SaveDisney 
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campaign. A choice that some suggest allowed for the enormous 
impact and success of the SaveDisney campaign. As the use of 
technology increases and shareholder interest in corporate governance 
grows, companies should expect this type of campaign to become 
more common. 
Conclusion 
The primary contribution of this analysis is greater 
understanding of the ways in which activist publics and stakeholder 
groups challenge legitimacy claims of other, more established 
organizations. In particular, it highlights the degree to which these 
publics tend to challenge specific actions based on their truth, 
rightness, and sincerity. 
Future research can build on these findings in a number of 
ways. First, one striking aspect of the legitimacy challenges initiated 
by the SaveDisney campaign is their focus on particular aspects of the 
Disney Corporation. The SaveDisney managers carefully targeted 
particular departments and practices while shielding the larger 
corporate purpose from criticism. In this, this case provides support 
for and a potential avenue for extension of Boyd’s (2000) actional 
legitimation. Specifically future work should look at legitimacy 
challenges that are not focused on specific actions but rather that 
target specific corporate units. Second, the challenges mounted by the 
SaveDisney campaign about the lack of company responsiveness can 
be seen as resulting from a violation of discourse ethics by the Walt 
Disney Company (Habermas, 1990; Leeper, 1996; Meisenbach, 
2006a). Analysis of this case in the context of discourse ethics might 
yield other interesting findings. 
At the end of this campaign, it seems to public eyes that R. 
Disney, Gold and their supporters did indeed save Disney and restore 
the magic in particular ways. The case is captivating in many respects 
due to its sophisticated persuasive strategies and its success in forcing 
change at the corporate level. Beyond this, the case of SaveDisney 
creates inroads for scholars and practitioners of strategic 
communication as it suggests ways to embrace dialogue and 
strengthen both understanding and powerful, yet ethical, use of 
legitimacy challenges. 
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Notes 
1. Botan and Taylor (2004) described this kind of assumption 
about publics as tied to a functional perspective, which “sees 
publics and communication as tools or means to achieve 
organizational ends” (p. 651).  
 
2. Habermas (1979) earlier discussed four validity claims. The 
fourth claim is to the intelligibility of the claim, deciding whether 
the listener can hear and understand the utterance. Leeper 
(1996) included all four in his brief analysis of claims used by 
Exxon in the Valdez incident, but since (a) all examples 
discussed under intelligibility were also discussed and part of 
consideration of the rightness and sincerity claims, and (b) 
Habermas (1984, 1987) dropped the intelligibility claim in his 
later development of validity claims, we do not develop it as a 
separate claim in this analysis.  
 
3. The primary author downloaded the entire web site as it existed 
on May 1, 2006. In addition the authors used the web archive, 
waybackmachine.org, to access all versions of the SaveDisney 
web site. All dates listed in this text for web site materials 
reference the dates posted on the material on the SaveDisney 
web site. We believe this indicates the date the material was 
published.  
References 
1. Allen, M. W., & Caillouet, R. H. (1994). Legitimation endeavors: 
Impression management strategies used by an organization in 
crisis. Communication Monographs, 61, 44–62. 
 
2. Botan, C. H., & Taylor, M. (2004). Public relations: The state of the 
field. Journal of Communication, 54, 645–661. 
 
3. Boyd, J. (2000). Actional legitimation: No crisis necessary. Journal of 
Public Relations Research, 12, 341–353. 
 
4. Boulding, K. E. (1978). The legitimacy of the business institution. In 
E. M. Epstein & D. Votaw (Eds.), Rationality, legitimacy, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2007): pg. 207-226. DOI. This article is © Taylor 
& Francis (Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & 
Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
24 
 
responsibility: Search for new directions in business and society 
(pp. 83–97). Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear. 
 
5. Bullert, B. J. (2000). Progressive public relations, sweatshops, and 
the net. Political Communication, 17, 403–407. 
 
6. Chay-Nemeth, C. (2001). Revising public: A critical archaeology of 
publics in the Thai HIV/AIDS Issue. Journal of Public Relations 
Research, 13, 127–161. 
 
7. Cheney, G., & McMillan, J. J. (1990). Organizational rhetoric and the 
practice of criticism. Journal of Applied Communication 
Research, 18, 93–114. 
8. Coombs, W. T. (1992). The failure of the task force on food 
assistance: A case study of the role of legitimacy in issue 
management. Journal of Public Relations Research, 4, 101–122. 
 
9. Deephouse, J. L. (1996). Does isomorphism legitimate? Academy of 
Management Journal, 39, 1024–1039. 
10. Dowling, J., & Pfeffer, J. (1975). Organizational legitimacy: Social 
values and organizational behavior. Pacific Sociological Review, 
18 (1), 122–135. 
 
11. Dozier, D. M., & Lauzen, M. M. (2000). Liberating the intellectual 
domain from practice: Public relations, activism, and the role of 
the scholar. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12, 3–22. 
 
12. Epstein, E. M., & Votaw, D. (Eds.). (1978). Rationality, legitimacy, 
responsibility: Search for new directions in business and society. 
Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear. 
 
13. Feldner, S. L., & Meisenbach, R. J. (2007). Saving Disney: Finding a 
voice for (counter)publics through the Internet. In S. C. Duhé 
(Ed.), New Media and Public Relations (pp. 189–201). New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing. 
 
14. Francesconi, R. A. (1982). James Hunt, the Wilmington 10, and 
institutional legitimacy. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 68, 47–59. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2007): pg. 207-226. DOI. This article is © Taylor 
& Francis (Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & 
Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
25 
 
15. Goldzwig, S. M., & Sullivan, P. A. (1995). Post-assassination 
newspaper editorial eulogies: Analysis and assessment. Western 
Journal of Communication, 59, 126–150. 
 
16. Grunig, L. A., Grunig, J. E., & Dozier, D. M. (2002). Excellent public 
relations and effective organizations. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
17. Grunig, J. E., & Hunt, T. (1984). Managing public relations. New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
 
18. Guiniven, J. E. (2002). Dealing with activism in Canada: An ideal 
cultural fit for the two-way symmetrical public relations model. 
Public Relations Review, 28, 393–402. 
19. Habermas, J. (1984). Theory of communicative: Volume 1: Reason 
and the rationalization of society. (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: 
Beacon Press. 
 
20. Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action: Volume 
II: Lifeworld and system. (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
 
21. Habermas, J. (1990). Moral consciousness and communicative 
action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
22. Hart, R. P. (1997). Modern rhetorical criticism (2nd ed.). Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon. 
 
23. Hearit, K. M. (1995). Mistakes were made: Organizations, apologia, 
and crises of social legitimacy. Communication Studies, 46, 1–
17. 
 
24. Hearit, K. M. (1999). Newsgroups, activist publics, and corporate 
apologia: The case of Intel and its Pentium chip. Public Relations 
Review, 25, 291–308. 
 
25. Holloway, R., & Stokes, A. (2006). Documentary as an activist 
medium: The Wal-Mart movie. Paper presented at the National 
Communication Association Convention, San Antonio, TX. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2007): pg. 207-226. DOI. This article is © Taylor 
& Francis (Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & 
Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
26 
 
26. Hoover’s (2007, July 24). The Walt Disney Company. Hoover’s 
Company Records -In-Depth Records. Retrieved July 27, 2007, 
from LexisNexis Academic database. 
 
27. Kent, M. L., & Taylor, M. (2002). Toward a dialogic theory of public 
relations. Public Relations Review, 28, 21–37. 
28. Kovacs, R. (2001). Relationship building as integral to British 
activism: Its impact on accountability in broadcasting. Public 
Relations Review, 27, 421–436. 
 
29. Leeper, R. V. (1996). Moral objectivity, Jurgen Habermas’s 
discourse ethics, and public relations. Public Relations Review, 
22, 133–150. 
 
30. Leitch, S., & Neilson, D. (2001). Bringing publics into public 
relations: New theoretical perspectives for practice. In R. L. 
Heath (Ed.), Handbook of public relations (pp. 127–138). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
31. Leitchy, G., & Warner, E. (2001). Cultural topoi: Implications for 
public relations. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Handbook of public 
relations (pp. 61–74). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
32. Meisenbach, R. J. (2006a). Habermas’ discourse ethics and principle 
of universalization as moral framework for organizational 
communication. Management Communication Quarterly, 20, 39–
62. 
 
33. Meisenbach, R. J. (2006b). The National College Registration Board: 
A case study in ethics and legitimacy. In S. K. May (Ed.), Case 
studies in organizations: Ethical perspectives and practices. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
34. Meisenbach, R. J., & McMillan, J. J. (2006). Blurring the boundaries: 
Historical developments and future directions in organizational 
rhetoric. In C. Beck (Ed.), Communication yearbook 30 (pp. 99–
104). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2007): pg. 207-226. DOI. This article is © Taylor 
& Francis (Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & 
Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
27 
 
35. Metzler, M. S. (2001). The centrality of organizational legitimacy to 
public relations practice. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Handbook of 
public relations (pp. 321–334). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
36. Meyer, J., & Scott, W. R. (1983). Centralization and the legitimacy 
problems of the local government. In J. W. Meyer & W. R. Scott 
(Eds.), Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality (pp. 
199–215) Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
37. Mitchell, G. J. (2005, March 13). Statement made by Senator 
George J. Mitchell. Retrieved on September 25, 2006 from: 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/news/corporate/2005/ 
2005_0313_stmt_gmitchell.html 
 
38. Mumby, D. (1988). Communication and power in organizations: 
Discourse, ideology, and domination. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
 
39. Patterson, J., & Allen, M. W. (1997). Accounting for your actions: 
How stakeholders respond to the strategic communication of 
environmental activist organizations. Journal of Applied 
Communication Research, 25, 293–316. 
 
40. Smith, M. F., & Ferguson, D. F. (2001). Activism. In R.L. Heath 
(Ed.), Handbook of public relations (pp. 291–300). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
41. Suchman, M. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and 
institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20, 
571–610. 
42. Taylor, M., Vasquez, G. M., & Doorley, J. (2003). Merck and AIDS 
activists: Engagement as a framework for extending issues 
management. Public Relations Review, 29, 257–270. 
 
43. Walt Disney Company (2004, February 6). Letter to Disney 
shareholders from the board of directors, The Walt Disney 
Company. Retrieved October 20, 2006, from 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/ 
files/2004_0206_shareholder1.pdf. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2007): pg. 207-226. DOI. This article is © Taylor 
& Francis (Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & 
Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
28 
 
44. Walt Disney Company (2001). 2001 Annual Report. Retrieved July 
25, 2007 from 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/investors/annual_reports/2001/i
ndex.html. 
 
45. Walt Disney Company (2006a). 2006 Annual Report. Retrieved July 
25, 2007 from 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/investors/annual_reports/2006/i
ndex.html. 
 
46. Walt Disney Company (2006b). Form 10-K September 30, 
2006.Retrieved July 25 2007, from Thomson ONE Banker 
database. 
 
